FIU Law Review
Volume 9

Number 2

Article 10

Spring 2014

Constitutional Concern, Membership, and Race
Sarah Krakoff
University of Colorado Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Other Law Commons

Online ISSN: 2643-7759
Recommended Citation
Sarah Krakoff, Constitutional Concern, Membership, and Race, 9 FIU L. Rev. 295 (2014).
DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.25148/lawrev.9.2.10

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by eCollections. It has been accepted for inclusion in FIU
Law Review by an authorized editor of eCollections. For more information, please contact lisdavis@fiu.edu.

KRAKOFF_PUBLISHER (DO NOT DELETE)

10/18/2014 1:23 PM

Constitutional Concern, Membership, and Race
Sarah Krakoff
INTRODUCTION
American Indian Tribes in the United States have a unique legal and
political status shaped by fluctuating federal policies and the over-arching
history of this country’s brand of settler-colonialism.1 One of the several
legacies of this history is that federally recognized tribes have membership
rules that diverge significantly from typical state or national citizenship
criteria. These rules and their history are poorly understood by judges and
members of the public, leading to misunderstandings about the “racial”
status of tribes and Indian people, and on occasion to incoherent and
damaging decisions on a range of Indian law issues. This article, which is
part of a larger project on tribes, sovereignty, and race, will discuss the
history of Florida’s tribes, their road from pre-contact independent peoples
to federally recognized tribes, and their contemporary membership criteria
in order to shed light on the inextricably political nature of race,
membership, and sovereignty in the American Indian context.2
There are 566 American Indian tribes that are federally recognized,
meaning that they have a direct government-to-government relationship
with the United States.3 One of the requirements for federal recognition,
both historical and contemporary, is descent from an historical Indian tribe
or group of tribes.4 To achieve recognition today, tribes must also
demonstrate that most of their members come from a “distinct
community.”5 Further, all tribes are required to have membership criteria.6

Professor and Schaden Chair of Experiential Learning, University of Colorado Law School. I
am grateful to Michael Daugherty for research assistance.
1
Settler colonial societies are those where non-indigenous people came to stay and quickly
outnumbered the indigenous inhabitants, thus making elimination of indigenous claims to territory the
primary object of settler laws and policies. See PATRICK WOLFE, SETTLER COLONIALISM AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF ANTHROPOLOGY 1-2 (1999); Patrick Wolfe, Land, Labor, and Difference:
Elementary Structures of Race, 106 AM. HIST. REV. 866, 867-68 (2001).
2
For the other articles related to this project, see Sarah Krakoff, Race, Membership and Tribal
Sovereignty, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1041 (2012) [hereinafter Inextricably Political]; Settler Colonialism and
Reclamation: Where American Indian Law and Natural Resources Law Meet, 24 COLO. NAT.
RESOURCES, ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 261 (2013).
3
See Indian Tribal Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the U.S. Bureau of
Indian Affairs, 79 Fed. Reg., no. 19, 4748 (Jan. 29, 2014).
4
See 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(e).
5
See 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(b).
6
See 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(d).
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While in theory tribes’ present-day membership criteria do not have to
include lineage or descent requirements, a long and complicated history,
which included many instances of coercion by the Federal Government, has
resulted in virtually all tribes requiring some form of ancestral or familial
tie to be a member.7 Taking these requirements together, all federally
recognized tribes are required by federal and tribal law to show that their
members have some shared ancestry with pre-contact indigenous peoples.8
At the same time, today’s federally recognized tribes are composed of
members whose ethnic, racial, linguistic, and cultural heritage is quite
diverse.9 Tribes’ political status today seldom (if ever) tracks their precontact group identity seamlessly. Some tribes were compelled to join
together as a single federally-recognized entity, while others were scattered
and dispersed irrespective of their historical unity.10 The legal category
“federally recognized tribe” is therefore political in several senses, and the
membership rules for such tribes are likewise both products and expressions
of politics, even while they also include (indeed must include) lineal
descent or other ancestry requirements.
In Morton v. Mancari, the Supreme Court held that federal
classifications that further the unique government-to-government
relationship with American Indian tribes should not be subject to
heightened scrutiny.11 Mancari upheld an employment preference for tribal
members at the Bureau of Indian Affairs, noting along the way that the
preference was conferred on Indians who were members of a tribe, and not
on all people who could claim to be Indian as a racial or ethnic matter. The
Court therefore described the classification as political rather than racial for
the purpose of its analysis.12 While some courts and commentators have
made much of the “political versus racial or ethnic” distinction, the better
reading of Mancari is that classifications that recognize the unique status
and rights of tribes, even if they necessarily include aspects of lineage and
descent, should generally be upheld. As the leading American Indian law
treatise states, “[a] sound reading of Morton v. Mancari would
acknowledge that even though ancestry may figure into some Indian
classifications, ultimately the most important inquiry is whether the law can
7
See, e.g., Inextricably Political, supra note 2; Paul Spruhan, A Legal History of Blood Quantum
in Federal Indian Law to 1935, 51 S.D. L. REV. 1 (2006); Kirsty Gover, Genealogy as Continuity:
Explaining the Growing Tribal Preference for Descent Rules in Membership Governance in the United
States, 33 AM. IND. L. REV. 243 (2008-09).
8
See Inextricably Political, supra note 2, at 1081-82. It is also possible that connection to a precontact group is a constitutional requirement for tribal recognition.
9
See id. at 1103.
10 See id. at 1118.
11 See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974).
12 See id. at 553 n.24.
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be justified as fulfilling ‘Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indians.”13
Recently, however, the Supreme Court and some lower federal courts
have expressed concern about laws that acknowledge the distinct political
and legal status of American Indian tribes and tribal members.14 In
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, the Court interpreted the Indian Child
Welfare Act (ICWA) narrowly to exclude its application to a case involving
the adoption of a child who, the Court noted repeatedly, was “classified as
an Indian because she is 1.2% (3/256) Cherokee.”15 The parties opposing
application of the ICWA had pressed an equal protection argument.16
While the Court concluded that the ICWA’s “plain text” controlled the
outcome and therefore did not reach the equal protection issue, the Court
was nonetheless troubled by the fact that this child’s fate could differ from
that of other prospective adoptive children because of what the Court
perceived to be her scant blood tie to an Indian tribe.17 The Court therefore
mentioned, near the end of its opinion, that excluding the case from the
ICWA’s requirements avoided “equal protection concerns.”18 Under
Mancari’s approach, however, there are no such concerns. The child in
Adoptive Couple was eligible for membership in the Cherokee Nation
according to the Nation’s citizenship rules, which require direct descent
from a member of the Cherokee rolls taken during a federal census from
1899-1906. Therefore while the Court described the child as “1.2%
Cherokee,” it might instead have described her as “eligible to be a Cherokee
citizen,” which, had she been able to enroll, would have made her “100%
Cherokee” in the only sense with any relevance to the opinion. The ICWA
distinguishes between members of tribes and nonmembers, not people who
are racially Indian or not. Further, there is no doubt that the ICWA was
passed in furtherance of Congress’s unique obligation to American Indian
tribes, so under the Mancari framework this was an easy case.19
The Court’s tendency to conflate the categories of race, lineage, and
tribal membership, and to see all of those classifications as troubling
regardless of the context or purposes, has been developing over time.20 In

13 COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 14.03[2][b] at 927 (Nell Jessup Newton et
al. eds., 2005).
14 See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013); KG Urban Enters., LLC, v. Patrick,
693 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012); Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 1997).
15 See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2556, 2559, 2565.
16 See Response of Guardian Ad Litem in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Adoptive
Couple v. Baby Girl, No. 12-399, 2012 WL 5209997, at *10 (Oct. 22, 2012).
17 See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2565.
18 See id. at 2565.
19 See infra Part I. A. (describing history and purposes of the ICWA).
20 This trend is part of a larger one, in which the Court subjects all government classifications,
even those designed to achieve substantive racial and ethnic equality, to the Court’s highest level of
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Rice v. Cayetano, the Court expressed the view that a lineage requirement
was simply a “proxy for race” when it struck down a state voting law on the
ground that it violated the Fifteenth Amendment.21 While Rice did not
involve a federal law affecting a recognized American Indian tribe, the
Court’s views about lineage and race, evident in both Rice and Adoptive
Couple, do not augur well for future cases involving such challenges. As
the Court moves, in general, toward an increasingly ahistorical and
genealogical approach to racial classifications, it sows confusion about
tribes, their status, and their interests, and obscures the law’s historical role
in racializing and subordinating American Indians as well as other groups.22
The Court’s purportedly “color-blind” approach risks reinscribing the
various forms of racial subordination that contemporary laws have aimed to
reverse.
This Article wades into this difficult terrain. After a review of equal
protection law, the Article will recount, in necessarily cursory fashion, the
story of how the Seminole Tribe of Indians of Florida and the Miccosukee
Tribe of Florida evolved from pre-contact sovereign peoples to their current
status as federally recognized tribes. Like many tribes, the Seminole and
Miccosukee survived a violent history replete with attempts to eliminate
them. Both tribes descend from the Creek and other indigenous peoples,
and each tribe also has members who reflect a range of other ethnic, racial,
and cultural backgrounds. Their histories reveal how race was used to
marginalize and subordinate tribes, and also how distinct political groups
were carved out of larger ethnic, linguistic, and cultural peoples. The
Article will then consider the Seminole and Miccosukee’s current
membership rules in order to reflect on the role of tribal membership
criteria more generally. Whether lineal descent requirements, as in the case
of the Cherokee Nation, or quarter or more ancestry requirements, as at
Seminole and Miccosukee respectively, tribal membership criteria are
political expressions of a people trying to maintain an indigenous cultural
identity against the backdrop of histories that reflected the dominant, if
inconsistent, goal of wiping them out. The Article ends by considering how
these histories should influence our views of federal equal protection
challenges to laws that further tribal political independence. First, tribal

scrutiny. Reva Siegel has described this as the shift from an antisubordination to an anticlassification
approach to equal protection.
See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and
Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1473
(2004).
21 Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 514, 519-20 (2000).
22 See Siegel, supra note 20. For more on the socio-legal construction of race generally, see IAN
F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (rev. ed. 2006) (analyzing
legal construction of racial hierarchies in the United States); MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT,
RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1994).
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membership criteria should be seen in their proper light, as expressions of
tribal political identity as well as mandatory federal requirements for
separate political status. Second, and following from that, courts should
continue to hew to the holding in Morton v. Mancari,23 upholding laws that
are rooted in the political relationship between tribes and the Federal
Government and that further the government’s unique obligations to tribes.
I. EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE COURT’S RECENT BOUT OF
“CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERN”
A. Constitutional Concern and Baby Veronica
In 2013, the Supreme Court decided Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, a
case involving the custody of a young child who spent the first two years of
her life with white adoptive parents and the next two years with her
biological father, an enrolled member of the Cherokee Nation of
Oklahoma.24 The fate of Baby Veronica, as she became known in the press,
captivated national attention as well as the support of former U.S. Solicitor
Paul Clement, who has made no secret of his interests in reversing Morton
v. Mancari and limiting federal laws that recognize American Indian tribal
rights.25 The case proved to be a good vehicle to challenge aspects of the
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA),26 a federal law that imposes distinct
procedural and substantive requirements on the adoption and foster care
placement of American Indian children, because the Act’s application to
Baby Veronica resulted in the tearful scene of her being taken away from
her adoptive parents at the age of two by a father whom she had never met.
In an opinion that was clearly swayed by the adoptive parents’ narrative of
the story, the Supreme Court held that the ICWA did not apply to Baby
Veronica’s adoption.27 This set in motion the second wrenching change of
custody in the girl’s short life, which was carried out with dispatch when
the adoptive parents took her from her Cherokee father back to a home that
it is likely she barely recalled.
The Indian Child Welfare Act was passed in 1978 in response to
overwhelming evidence that state and private child welfare workers and
adoption agencies were removing American Indian children from their
families at shocking rates.28 The removals were often based on biases or

23

Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013).
25 See Gregory Smith & Carolyn Mayhew, Apocalypse Now: The Unrelenting Assault on Morton
v. Mancari, 60 FED. LAWYER 47, 48, 55 (2013).
26 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901, et seq.
27 See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552.
28 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 9 (1978); S. REP. NO. 95-597, at 11-13 (1977); see also COHEN,
24
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misunderstandings about American Indian family structures and norms, and
were sufficiently widespread to create existential threats to some tribes.
The ICWA put in place a number of procedural and substantive
requirements that mandate Tribal Court jurisdiction in some cases; allow
tribal participation in state proceedings in others; and impose different
standards for removal, placement, and termination of parental rights.29 The
ICWA treats American Indian children differently from other children
based on their political status as members, or potential members, of
federally recognized tribes.30 Without this distinct treatment, the statute
would have no effect or purpose. The ICWA was designed to address the
fundamental problem (by many accounts a continuing one)31 of
discriminatory interference in the families of American Indian tribal
members. The solution was to bolster legal protections for those families
based on their status as members of sovereign nations with their own legal
systems, and to recognize rights in both the family members and the tribes
to enforce the law.32
Like all laws, the ICWA is neither perfectly enforced nor perfectly
crafted. In terms of enforcement, many state courts initially resisted its
application, and state child welfare workers and private adoption agencies
were slow to get the news that their practices had to change. For many
lawyers and judges, the overlay of federal law onto their typically state-lawonly practices was odd and unfamiliar. Delay in identifying children as
Indian, notifying tribes, and applying the ICWA’s protective measures often
resulted in situations where courts then strained to avoid the ICWA’s
application at all.33 In terms of the legislation itself, there are some gaps in
terms of when and how tribes have to be notified, again contributing to
delay and consequent resistance to enforcement.34 Despite the fact that in
the vast majority of cases, the ICWA is applied without incident to the
benefit of Indian children, their families, their tribes, and all other parties
involved,35 the problems and gaps lead to anguished situations that tend to
supra note 13, at § 11.01[2], 821-25.
29 See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901, et seq.; COHEN, supra note 13, at §§ 11.02-11.06, 826-48 (reviewing
provisions of the ICWA).
30 See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4), et seq.
31 See, e.g., Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Hunnik, No. 13-5020-JLV, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10162
(S.D. Jan. 28, 2014) (class action lawsuit brought by tribes alleging widespread violations of the ICWA
in the state of South Dakota).
32 See COHEN, supra note 13, at § 11.01[2], 824.
33 See id. at § 11.05[2], 844-45 (describing misuses of “good cause” exception to the ICWA’s
placement preferences); § 11.07, 852-55 (describing judge-made doctrine, often called the “existing
Indian family doctrine” employed to avoid application of the ICWA).
34 See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (requiring notice to tribe only in involuntary proceedings).
35 See, e.g., B.J. JONES ET AL., INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT: A PILOT STUDY OF COMPLIANCE IN
NORTH DAKOTA (2000).
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grab all of the headlines. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl was such a case.
Baby Veronica’s birth mother and father were engaged but living apart
when the birth mother informed the father she was pregnant. The birth
father urged the birth mother to move up their wedding plans. Apparently
she refused and their relations deteriorated from there.36 While the U.S.
Supreme Court opinion did not emphasize some of the following facts, the
South Carolina State Supreme Court, which affirmed a lower court decision
to award custody to the Cherokee father, included them in its opinion.
First, although the birth mother knew that the father was an enrolled
member of the Cherokee Nation and testified that she made his heritage
known to the adoptive parents and to all agencies involved, the South
Carolina Court concluded that “there were some efforts to conceal [the birth
father’s] Indian status.”37 Specifically, the birth mother “initially . . . did
not wish to identify the father, said she wanted to keep things [as] low-key
as possible for the [adoptive parents], because he’s registered in the
Cherokee tribe. It was determined that naming him would be detrimental to
the adoption.”38 In addition, the lawyer who was hired by the adoptive
parents to represent the birth mother misspelled the birth father’s name and
misrepresented his birth date in the letter to the Cherokee Nation. The
Cherokee Nation, faced with inaccurate information, therefore responded
that they could not confirm that the child was an Indian child.39 Finally, the
birth mother, when it came time to deliver the baby, requested that the
hospital put her on “no report” status, meaning that if anyone inquired about
her, the hospital should list her as not admitted. After delivery, the birth
mother listed the baby’s status as Hispanic only (and not Native American
or Cherokee) on the form necessary under Oklahoma law to approve the
baby’s transfer from the state.40 Baby Veronica was therefore delivered
shortly after her birth into the arms of the adoptive parents and taken to
their home in South Carolina without the additional procedures, including
notification to the Tribe and likely refusal to transfer from Oklahoma,
which the ICWA would have required.41
For his part, the birth father, after failing to convince the birth mother
to move up their wedding, told the birth mother that he would relinquish his
parental rights rather than pay child support. He testified, however, that he
thought that the birth mother would keep the child, and that if he gave her
some time and space, the couple would reconcile and raise the baby
36
37
38
39
40
41

See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2558.
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 398 S.C. 625 (2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013).
See Adoptive Couple, 398 S.C. at 632.
See id.
Id. at 633.
See id. at 633-34.
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together.42 While the birth father acknowledged that some of his
interactions with the birth mother were not models of exemplary parenting,
“Mother never informed Father that she intended to place the baby up for
adoption. Father insists that, had he known this, he would have never
considered relinquishing his rights.”43
The adoptive parents filed for adoption in South Carolina when Baby
Veronica was nine days old. The birth father was not served with notice of
the adoption until four months later, on the eve of his deployment to Iraq
for military service. Initially, when the process server pressed the papers on
him, the birth father signed away his right to object to the adoption. As
soon as he realized that it was an outside adoption rather than
relinquishment to the birth mother, he tried to get the papers back: “I then
tried to grab the paper up. [The process server] told me that I could not
grab that [sic] because . . . I would be going to jail if I was to do any harm
to the paper.”44 The birth father immediately consulted with his family,
contacted a lawyer, and the next day filed for a stay of the adoption
proceedings.45
Like most family law stories that make their way to popular
consciousness, by the time Baby Veronica’s case reached the U.S.
Supreme Court there would be no universal happy ending. The rest of the
case and its history are recounted in the Supreme Court opinion: the South
Carolina family court awarded custody to the birth father in 2011 and Baby
Veronica was transferred to her father’s custody. The adoptive parents
appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court, which affirmed the lower
court’s decision under the ICWA.46 The adoptive parents then petitioned
for certiorari to the Supreme Court, where they won and, at the age of four,
Baby Veronica was ordered to be returned to their custody.47
Had a few things gone differently, Baby Veronica would in all
likelihood never have been placed with the adoptive family in the first
place. If the birth mother had clarified that she intended to give the child up
for adoption; if the birth mother’s lawyer had spelled the father’s name
correctly and/or referenced his actual birth date; if the birth mother had not
omitted Baby Veronica’s Cherokee heritage from the form required by
Oklahoma to allow her transfer out of state; if any one or all of these had
occurred, Baby Veronica would have been placed with her biological father

42

See id. at 631.
Id.
44 Id. at 634.
45 See id.
46 See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2556-57 (2013).
47 See id. at 2559, 2565; see also Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 404 S.C. 483 (2013) (directing
entry of order finalizing adoption after remand from U.S. Supreme Court).
43
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from the outset. While that outcome may not be the preferred result of
those who think that birth mothers should have a greater say than birth
fathers about the placement of their biological children, it would
(presumably) not strike the same nerve as the specter of removing a child
who was two years old from, as Justice Alito wrote “the only parents she
had ever known.”48 In other words, the attempt to avoid the ICWA’s
application in the first place created the sympathetic factual scenario that
became its own logic for interpreting the ICWA narrowly in order to place
Baby Veronica with the adoptive parents.
Justice Alito’s several references to the (apparently) troublingly slim
connection that Baby Veronica had to her Cherokee heritage must be
examined in this light. It is correct that but for this heritage, Baby
Veronica’s adoption would have proceeded quite differently. It is also the
case, however, that but for the attempt to avoid the ICWA’s application to
Baby Veronica, she would have had a stable placement with her father or
his relatives from the outset of her life. Furthermore, as Justice Sotomayor
emphasized in her dissent, several states recognize similarly strong rights
by birth fathers in the adoption context, including Arizona, Washington and
Nevada.49 In other words, it is not just membership in an Indian tribe that
can result in distinctive treatment in the adoption context. If the adoption
had taken place in Washington, it also would have required additional
procedural and substantive protections for the father.50 Flukes of birth,
geographical and otherwise, lead to different legal regimes. What troubled
Justice Alito was that this fluke sounded in ancestry rather than geography.
And yet, Baby Veronica’s lineal descent from a member of the Cherokee
Nation’s historic rolls is what constituted her eligibility for tribal
membership. When the Justice wrote, disparagingly, that Baby Veronica
was “classified as an Indian because she is 1.2% (3/256) Cherokee,”51 he
could have written that she was “classified as an Indian because she was
eligible for membership in a federally recognized Indian tribe.” All Justice
Alito was doing, in essence, was repeating that Baby Veronica met the
tribe’s political membership requirements.
Justice Alito’s apparent discomfort with Baby Veronica’s “1.2%”
status begs the question of whether it would have been any less troubling if
the Cherokee Nation had a different set of membership requirements,
perhaps with a higher degree of “Cherokee blood.” If Baby Veronica had
been “more Indian by blood,” would it have struck the Justices as less
unfair that a white family could not adopt her? Justice Alito’s repeated (and
48
49
50
51

Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2556.
See id. at 2581-82 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
See id.
Id. at 2552, 2556 (emphasis added).
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unnecessary) references to Baby Veronica’s percentage of Cherokee
heritage resonate in unfortunate ways with the eliminationist agenda behind
the racialization of American Indians during some of our most shameful
historical periods.52 The eliminationist logic that Justice Alito (no doubt
unknowingly) echoed was that Indian tribes must eventually disappear, and
that one pathway for making them do so was to shrink the number of people
eligible to be tribal members.53
B. Morton v. Mancari and the Political-not-Racial Distinction
Had the Court gone any further than merely mentioning its concern
about the constitutionality of the ICWA’s application to Baby Veronica, it
would have run into its own wall of precedent. In Morton v. Mancari, the
Supreme Court upheld a Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) employment
preference against a challenge brought by non-Indian plaintiffs.54 The
Court held that federal classifications that benefit American Indians should
be upheld so long as they can be tied to “Congress’ unique obligations
toward the Indians.”55 To put this in the context of equal protection
doctrine generally, the Supreme Court has settled on a three-tier system for
the judicial review of equal protection challenges to federal or state actions
that burden or benefit particular groups.56 First, the Court subjects most
classifications to rational basis review, meaning that if the legal distinction
is based on any facially plausible rationale, the Court will not second-guess
the legislative decision.57 Second, a middle-tier of review (known as
“intermediate scrutiny”), applied most commonly to classifications based
on sex, asks whether the distinction is reasonably related to an important
governmental objective.58 And third, classifications based on race or
52 See Inextricably Political, supra note 2, at 1065-70; see also Bethany Berger, Red: Racism and
the American Indian, 56 UCLA L. REV. 591 (2009)
53 See Inextricably Political, supra note 2, at 1070.
54 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
55 Id. at 555.
56 Equal protection challenges to federal action are brought under the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment rather than the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies
only to states, but the “Court repeatedly has held that the Fifth Amendment imposes on the Federal
Government the same standard required of state legislation by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.” Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 226 n.6 (1981) (citing Weinberger v.
Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 768-70 (1975)); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971).
57 See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (upholding state law requiring police
officers to retire at age fifty); San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (upholding school
funding system that discriminated against poor districts); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLE AND POLICIES 669-74 (3d ed. 2006) (summarizing tiers of judicial
review). But see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (applying strengthened version of rational basis
review to equal protection challenge involving distinctions based on sexual orientation).
58 For the latest articulation of the gender standard of intermediate scrutiny, see United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). On very rare occasions, the Supreme Court has applied heightened
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ethnicity are subject to the Court’s most exacting review (“strict scrutiny”),
which asks whether there is a compelling state interest that supports the
classification and whether the government’s means of achieving that
interest are narrowly tailored to the government’s objective.59 Overtly
discriminatory classifications—those that deprive racial or ethnic groups of
access to programs or benefits because of their racial or ethnic status—
nearly automatically fail strict scrutiny.60 The harder cases involve either
actions that do not overtly sort people based on race or ethnicity, but that
nonetheless result in disparate effects on minority racial or ethnic groups, or
actions that sort people by race or ethnicity with the benign purpose of
either remedying past discrimination or promoting diversity.61 Challenges
to affirmative action programs in education and employment fall into the
latter category.62
In Mancari, the Court adopted a form of the first type of review—
rational basis review—for federal classifications singling out members of
American Indian tribes for distinctive treatment. According to Mancari, if
the classification is based on tribal members’ political affiliation with a
recognized American Indian tribe63 and furthers Congress’s “unique
obligation” to American Indians, then the Court will not subject it to a
heightened form of judicial review.64 Applied straight up, the ICWA
should pass this test easily, even on the facts of the Baby Veronica case.
Veronica was eligible for membership in her tribe based on the Cherokee

review based on an ad-hoc mix of factors. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (factors
warranting heightened scrutiny included childhood, education, and minority status).
59 See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005) (strict scrutiny must be used in evaluating
the routine racial segregation of new intake prisoners); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995) (federal affirmative action programs must meet strict scrutiny); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
476 U.S. 267 (1986) (striking down school board’s policy of extending preferential protection against
layoffs to some employees because of their race); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 57, at 694-95.
60 See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (state court acted unconstitutionally by taking into
account a stepfather’s race in child custody case); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (finding state
miscegenation statute unconstitutional); Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964) (striking down statute
requiring the race of candidates for office to be listed on ballots); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 57, at 671
(“Strict scrutiny is virtually always fatal to the challenged law.”).
61 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003);
Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989);
McKlesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (proof of racially disproportionate impact in administration of
death penalty did not constitute equal protection violation); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)
(upholding police departments use of a test that disproportionately disadvantaged African-American
applicants).
62 See Grutter, 539 U.S. 306; Gratz, 539 U.S. 244; Adarand, 515 U.S. 200; Croson, 488 U.S.
469.
63 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974) (“The preference is not directed towards a
‘racial’ group consisting of ‘Indians’; instead, it applies only to members of ‘federally recognized’
tribes.”).
64 Id. at 555.
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Nations’ rules, and the ICWA furthers Congress’s obligation to ensure the
survival of tribes by eliminating rampant and biased activities that
dismantled tribal families.
For a host of practical and legal reasons, the Mancari rule makes
sense. As the Mancari Court noted, the Federal Government has been
treating American Indian tribes and their members distinctively since the
country’s founding.65 License for distinctive treatment exists in the
Constitution,66 in the history of federal-tribal legal relations,67 and in
international law norms that formed the basis for domestic federal Indian
law.68 Further, if the Court had held otherwise, federal courts could be
subjecting scores of treaties, statutes, and policies to heightened judicial
scrutiny.69 Perhaps this unmanageability has kept courts in check on these
issues. If they peek behind the curtain of tribal political classifications, they
will have to assume the wizard’s role, deciding one case at a time whether a
distinction that affects tribes or tribal members withstands strict scrutiny.70
Doing so would take courts well beyond their traditional competencies, and
intrude into centuries of agreements and relations with hundreds of tribes.
C. Nipping at Mancari
Whether due to the strength of Mancari’s underlying rationale or to the
Supreme Court’s concerns about its institutional competence (or both), to
date Mancari has survived intact. Adoptive Couple did not come out of
nowhere, however. For years, various parties, including some ideologically
and politically motivated interest groups, have mounted challenges to
classifications that benefit tribes and tribal members in an effort to have the
Court overturn or modify Mancari.71 Mancari’s opponents have relied on
language in two post-Mancari Supreme Court cases to support their
arguments.
First, in Adarand Constructors, Inc., the Supreme Court considered a
65

See id. at 551-53.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“[Congress has the power to . . .] regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes . . . .”).
67 See William W. Quinn, Federal Acknowledgment of American Indian Tribes: The Historical
Development of a Legal Concept, 34 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 331, 338-47 (1990).
68 See ROBERT WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE
DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 218 (1990); Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN.
L. REV. 31 (1996); see also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. 1 (1831); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823) (relying on the discovery doctrine, including its
origins in international law, as basis for U.S. relations with tribes).
69 See Mancari, 417 U.S. at 552.
70 See Carole Goldberg, American Indians and “Preferential” Treatment, 49 UCLA L. REV. 943,
955-57 (2002).
71 See Smith & Mayhew, supra note 25 (describing efforts of Mountain States Legal Foundation
and Paul Clement to overturn or narrow Mancari).
66
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challenge to a federal program offering financial incentives to contractors
who hired subcontractors controlled by economically and socially
disadvantaged groups.72 The federal program listed certain races and
ethnicities as having presumptive status as socially disadvantaged,
including African American, Hispanic, Asian Pacific, Subcontinent Asian,
and Native American.73 The issue before the Court was whether the
program should be reviewed under the intermediate standard of scrutiny,
announced in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,74 or strict scrutiny, which
would require the Federal Government to show that its interest in the
preference was compelling, and that it had employed the least restrictive
means of meeting that interest.75
Adarand was an important case for opponents of affirmative action
programs, who had already succeeded in subjecting state-based versions to
the highest level of scrutiny.76 If federal preferences could be treated
similarly, then the era of benign governmental uses of race and ethnicity to
level the social and economic playing field would be all but over. In
Adarand, that goal was achieved. The Court concluded that Metro
Broadcasting, its precedent of just five years earlier, should be overturned.77
Justice O’Connor disparaged Metro Broadcasting for its conclusion that
race could be presumed to be a benign category, even if its purpose was to
allow participation by historically disadvantaged groups.78 Adhering to the
view that the Constitution protects individuals, not groups, Justice
O’Connor concluded that any use of race was presumptively suspicious
because its effect was to burden individuals with the government’s effort to
create greater economic opportunity for disadvantaged groups.79
Adarand did not address legislation or classifications passed in
furtherance of Congress’ unique obligation to American Indian tribes. Yet
because Adarand applied the Court’s highest scrutiny to actions by
Congress, it has been looked upon as a first step toward questioning
Mancari.80 Advocates and some courts have seized on language in Justice
Stevens’ Adarand dissent, which cautioned that the Court’s reasoning could
lead toward the conclusion that the federal relationship with tribes should

72

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 204 (1995).
See id. at 207.
74
497 U.S. 547 (1990).
75
See id.
76
See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
77
See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
78
See id. at 226.
79
Id. at 226-27.
80
See Smith & Mayhew, supra note 25, at 51-53 (discussing cases and briefs arguing that
Adarand undermines Mancari).
73
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be seen in the same light as invidious racial classifications.81 Justice
Stevens was warning about this interpretation; not embracing it nor stating
it was inevitable.82 Nonetheless, in Williams v. Babbitt, the Ninth Circuit
refused to read a Native American preference into the Reindeer Act of
1937, concluding that to do so would raise “grave” constitutional
questions.83 The Babbitt court relied on what it claimed to be Justice
Stevens’ assessment of the “logical implications” of Adarand, and then
went so far as to predict that Mancari’s “days are numbered.”84 To date,
that prediction has not held. Eighteen years after Adarand, the Supreme
Court has yet to question Mancari directly.
Nonetheless, a second Supreme Court case, Rice v. Cayetano,85
provides succor to Mancari’s detractors on different grounds. In Rice, a
non-Native Hawaiian challenged voting restrictions for the Office of
Hawaiian Affairs (OHA). The OHA was created by Hawaii to administer
programs for Native Hawaiians consistent with the State’s historic and legal
obligations to its indigenous population. Hawaii restricted voting for the
OHA Board of Trustees to Native Hawaiians, defined according to when
their ancestors arrived in Hawaii. The State argued that the classification
was based on lineal descent from indigenous peoples, and not on race or
ethnicity, but the Court found that the ancestry component of the
requirement was merely a “proxy” for race.86 On one hand, Rice did not
question Mancari itself.87 Rather, Rice held that Mancari did not apply to
the Hawaii voting law for two reasons. First, the state, and not the Federal
Government, had imposed the restriction. Second, Native Hawaiians are
not a federally recognized tribe.88 The Court therefore struck down the
State’s voting restriction on Fifteenth Amendment grounds.89 Yet Rice’s
language about the equivalence between ancestry and “race” opens the door
to reasoning that questions tribal membership rules and leaves them
vulnerable to being seen as invidious racial classifications. Justice Alito’s
repeated references to Baby Veronica’s percentage of Cherokee blood echo
this conflation of lineal descent and race.90 Thus, while Rice is even less
directly challenging to Mancari than Adarand, together the cases provide
distinct building blocks for those pursuing an anti-tribal agenda. They urge
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 244 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See id.
Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 666 (9th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 665.
528 U.S. 495 (2000).
Id. at 514.
See id. at 519.
See id. at 520.
See id. at 517.
See generally supra notes 49-53, and accompanying text.
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that the Federal Government should treat all distinct groups equally,
irrespective of history, context, and purpose. Unique legal obligations and
political relationships, some of which inevitably are rooted in ancestry, are
seen as no worthier of deferential treatment by the courts than overtly
discriminatory and exclusionary laws.91
II. FEDERAL RECOGNITION IS POLITICAL: A TRIP TO FLORIDA
Mancari made the distinction between classifications that address
members of federally recognized tribes, and those that distinguish only
based on race or ethnicity.92 As discussed above, one approach to eroding
Mancari is to question whether the political status (and membership rules)
of tribes are just a “proxy for race.” Tribes are composed of members who
share ancestry. This seems to cut against liberal consent-based norms for
democratic governance, lending credence to the notion that lineage and race
are indistinguishable constructs.93 To question the political status of tribes,
however, is to delve into the history of federal recognition itself, including
the process by which indigenous peoples traveled from free and
independent polities to the legal category of “federally recognized tribe”
that they occupy today.94 That history reveals that federally recognized
tribal status is indeed political, in nearly every sense of the word. Power,
violence, and resistance characterized the process, and inevitably racial
formation played, and continues to play, a role.95 Tribes, in other words,
are political even while they reflect the unique ways in which American
Indians were racialized by the American version of settler-colonialism.96 In
other articles, I have explored how these processes played out for the
Colorado River Indian Tribes and the several federally recognized tribes in
the Dakotas that were carved out of the Great Sioux Nation.97 Here, I apply
a similar analysis to the Seminole Tribe of Florida and the Miccosukee
Tribe of Florida.
A. Seminole and Miccosukee: Separate Tribes, Shared Roots
Today, the indigenous people known as Seminole are divided into
three federally recognized tribes and one non-recognized group. Two of the

91

See Smith & Mayhew, supra note 25.
See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974).
93 See Gover, supra note 7, at 250. To be clear, however, all members of tribes must also consent
to their enrollment. Consent is therefore necessary but not sufficient for membership in an American
Indian tribe.
94 See Inextricably Political, supra note 2, at 1061-83.
95 See id.
96 See id. at 1118-22.
97 See id.; see also Krakoff, Settler Colonialism and Reclamation, supra note 2.
92
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three federally recognized tribes are in Florida—the Seminole Tribe of
Florida, and the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida—the third is the
Seminole Nation of Oklahoma.
The non-recognized group is the
Traditional (or Independent) Seminole Nation.98 The Seminole Tribe of
Florida’s land base includes the Big Cypress Reservation, Brighton
Reservation, Hollywood Reservation, Immokalee Reservation, Tampa
Reservation, and Fort Pierce Reservation. The Miccosukee Tribe’s lands
consist of four reservations, the Tamiami Trail Reservation, Alligator Alley
Reservation (the largest, at a size of nearly 75,000 acres), and two smaller
reservations at the intersection of Krome Avenue and the Tamiami Trail in
Miami. The Seminole people (the term “Seminole” will be used to refer to
all people of Seminole origin, regardless of current political affiliation in
the Seminole or Miccosukee Tribes) speak two languages with common
linguistic roots—Muskogee and Mikasuki.99 The Miccosukee and most
Seminole Tribe members speak Mikasuki, while Seminole Tribe members
at the Brighton Reservation speak Muskogee.100
As historian Brent Weisman has observed, “[t]he division between the
Seminole and Miccosukee tribes reflects differing responses by groups of
related people to the federal tribal recognition process rather than deepseated differences in cultural or historical origins.”101 The story of how
Florida’s indigenous people of shared origins became differentiated into
several political entities, each also with a distinct cultural identity, reflects
the processes of settler occupation of North America, fluctuating U.S.
policies toward tribes, and indigenous responses of survival and adaptation.
1. From “Creek” to “Seminole”
As with all histories of indigenous peoples in the pre-contact period,
much of what we know about Florida and the Southeast has been
reconstructed from archeological sources. According to these, when
Spanish explorers first arrived in Florida in the early 1500s, the indigenous
population was roughly 350,000.102 Diseases brought by Europeans
coupled with deliberate efforts to exterminate the indigenous population,
resulting in devastating population losses. By the 1700s, the Southeast

98 See Kirsten Matoy Carlson & Robert T. Coulter, Natural Allies: Conservationists, Indian
Tribes, and Protecting Native North America, in TRIBES, LAND AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Ezra Rosser &
Sarah Krakoff, eds., 2012).
99 Brent R. Weisman, Nativism, Resistance, and Ethnogenesis of the Florida Seminole Indian
Identity, in 41:4 HIST. ARCHAEOLOGY 198, 199 (2007).
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 See JERALD T. MILANICH, FLORIDA’S INDIANS: FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE PRESENT at viii
(1998).
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indigenous population was already transformed significantly by Spanish,
British, and French settlement.103 Almost all of the pre-contact indigenous
peoples in Florida were gone, either because they did not survive the
European invasion or had been forced to leave the area.104 As a result, the
indigenous population of Florida in the 1700s was composed predominately
of Creek Indians who migrated from elsewhere in the Southeast, as well as
small populations of Florida’s indigenous peoples who managed to survive
from pre-contact times.
The Creeks who migrated into Florida became known as Lower
Creeks, and those who ended up in Alabama, as Upper Creeks. These
Creek migrations were a response to British expansion throughout
Georgia.105 The division into Lower and Upper Creeks was the first
European-provoked step toward the eventual split into Seminole and Creek
peoples. According to Weisman, “[i]t was from the Lower Creeks that the
founding populations of Seminole were to come.”106
Seminole political and cultural identity was forged during the
eighteenth century, when the Spanish attempted repeatedly to confine the
Lower Creeks in Florida to missions or communities near trading posts.
The Lower Creeks who refused to comply moved further into central
Florida and occupied land that had been largely (though not entirely)
abandoned by the Apalachee and other indigenous peoples who predated
the Spanish.107 During this period, the Spanish began to refer to the Lower
Creeks and other indigenous peoples uniformly as “cimmarones,” which
became Seminole in Creek pronunciation, meaning people who would not
be subdued.108 The term Seminole thus grew out of a blanket label that
Europeans applied to people they assumed to be Lower Creek, but that the
people themselves (of Lower Creek but also more diverse indigenous
origins) appropriated as a self-defining term of resistance.
The Seminoles’ resistance to colonial power grew throughout the
century, and culminated in an event that Weisman pinpoints as the date at
which Seminole identity truly began: “[i]f the birth of the Seminole can be
traced to a specific time and place, that date is November 18, 1765, the
place, Picolata on the banks of St. Johns River west of St. Augustine,
103

See id.; see also Weisman, supra note 99, at 200.
MILANICH, supra note 102, at viii.
105 BRENT RICHARDS WEISMAN, UNCONQUERED PEOPLE: FLORIDA’S SEMINOLE AND
MICCOSUKEE INDIANS 12 (1999).
106 Id. at 12.
107 Id. at 13-14. Not all of Florida’s pre-contact indigenous inhabitants were gone, and the
Seminole today also reflect the integration of Lower Creek with these peoples. See generally Frequently
Asked Questions, SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA, http://www.semtribe.com/FAQ/ (last visited Mar. 31,
2014).
108 WEISMAN, UNCONQUERED PEOPLE, supra note 105, at 14; Weisman, supra note 99, at 200.
104
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Florida.”109 At that point, the British controlled Florida. The British
Governor had invited the Lower Creeks to a gathering at which he planned
to explain that the entire peninsula was under British rule. The Governor
requested land cessions from the Lower Creek chiefs for all claims east of
the St. Johns. A ceremony was conducted, and the Lower Creeks and the
British appeared to have reached an agreement. According to Weisman,
what the Governor “did not understand was that Cowkeeper of the Alachua
band held himself apart from this conference, and in so doing made it clear
that the Lower Creeks did not speak for his interest.”110 Cowkeeper, a
formidable Seminole leader, forged his tribe’s identity by refusing to
participate in the land cessions, and instead arranging a meeting of his own
in December to negotiate with the British on his own terms.111 The results
included that a vast swathe of central Florida, today south of Gainesville,
would “become a heartland of the Seminole nation . . . .”112
2. Seminole Identity Formation: The First, Second, and Third
Seminole Wars
Cowkeeper’s strategic separation from the Creeks marked the
beginning of a distinct Seminole identity, and the ensuing decades further
defined the Seminole through acts of resistance. After the American
Revolution, the Spanish regained Florida from the British, but this was to
be a short-lived acquisition. The American ideology of Manifest Destiny
pushed American expansion south as well as west, and conflicts over
slavery heightened ambitions to eliminate an international border between
slave states and what they perceived as ungovernable terrain to which their
“property” could flee.113 Acquiring Florida and removing the Seminole
would therefore accomplish two racialized goals at once for the young
United States: property (in the form of land) would be acquired for nonIndian settlement, (necessitating the disappearance of the Indians
themselves); and the slave states could reassert their primacy over their
human property (Black slaves), by the same strategy of eliminating the
Indians.114 Weisman succinctly describes the zeitgeist of the times, “[i]f
destiny guided human affairs, and it most surely did, then this much was
certain: the Seminoles had to go.”115

109

WEISMAN, UNCONQUERED PEOPLE, supra note 105, at 14.
Id.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 15.
113 See id. at 43-44.
114 See id.; see also WOLFE, supra note 1, at 1-2 (explaining distinct logics of racial construction
of indigenous peoples versus African Americans in settler-colonial societies).
115 WEISMAN, UNCONQUERED PEOPLE, supra note 105, at 43.
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Efforts to eradicate the Seminole from Florida were carried out over
the course of several decades. In 1818, General Andrew Jackson, with a
force that included 1,500 Creek Indians, “swept into Spanish Florida on a
scorched earth offensive against the Florida Seminoles.”116 This offensive,
which has become known as the First Seminole War, eliminated several
Seminole villages and, more importantly for Jackson’s larger strategic
goals, paved the way for acquiring Florida from Spain. Having put up very
little defense to Jackson’s invasion, Spain ceded Florida to the United
States in 1821.
Andrew Jackson’s work with respect to eliminating the Seminole was
not yet complete, however. Many Seminole had evaded death or capture
during the First Seminole War, and once Florida formally joined the slaveholding south, pressure increased to free the territory for white settlement.
The slave states had particular concerns about the presence of Black
Seminole (former slaves who escaped to Florida and joined the Seminole,
many as free men), and in particular the specter of free Blacks living
alongside slaves.117 During this period, United States Indian Policy in
general was moving toward strategies of removal and containment, and
both of these methods were employed to wrest Florida from Seminole
control.118 To contain the Florida Indians, the government set about
counting the number of Seminoles and Black Seminoles, and obtaining
information about who was recognized as a Seminole leader or headman.
The headmen were then invited to a meeting at Moultrie Creek on the St.
Johns River, the purpose of which was to dictate the terms of a nonnegotiated treaty. The Treaty of Moultrie Creek, as it became known,
confined all Florida Seminoles to designated reservation lands, and
provided them with annuities and tools for twenty-five years, a school, an
Indian agent, and other minimal offerings.119 The Treaty also required the
Seminole to assist in the capture and return of any fugitive slaves.120
The Treaty of Moultrie Creek and its policy of containment failed
miserably. Having never agreed to be confined to the low-quality lands that
the government designated, a majority of the Seminole refused to move.
One Seminole leader, Neamathla, negotiated for lands near Apalachicola,
but otherwise the people had had no say and did not feel bound by the

116

Id. at 45.
See WEISMAN, UNCONQUERED PEOPLE, supra note 105, at 45.
118 For more on the removal policies generally, see ROBERT ANDERSON, ET AL., AMERICAN
INDIAN LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 50-77 (2nd ed., 2010).
119 See WEISMAN, UNCONQUERED PEOPLE, supra note 105, at 45-46; see generally Treaty with
the Florida Tribes of Indians, Sept. 18, 1823, 7 Stat. 224, available at
http://digital.library.okstate.edu/kappler/vol2/treaties/sem0203.htm.
120 See Treaty with the Florida Tribes of Indians, art. 7, Sept. 18, 1823, 7 Stat. 224.
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arbitrary lines drawn by government agents.121 Many Seminole also balked
at the requirement to return fugitive slaves. “Black Seminoles had become
important to the Indians, as partners, as subordinates, as allies. Who was to
say which of them was to go back?”122 The attempt to confine the Seminole
to reservations and cleave the Black Seminoles from among them backfired.
The Seminoles’ emerging identity as people known for their resistance had
further solidified through their refusal to be contained.123
By the 1830s, U.S. policies of Indian removal were in high gear.124
Government pressure on the Seminole to leave Florida for the proposed
Indian Territory (today’s Oklahoma) was intense, and some Seminole
complied. The ones who refused sharpened their identity through their
defiance of federal pressure and acts of resistance. The events that sparked
the Second Seminole War, which lasted from 1835-42, grew out of this
context.125 Seminole leaders, including Osceola, who came of age during
the Seminole resistance to Andrew Jackson’s forces during the Creek War,
staged an attack on U.S. troops in and around Fort King. A group of Black
Seminole, led by Abraham, joined in the resistance as well.126 What
followed was a seven-year war that drew in every regiment of the U.S.
Army. More than 1,500 U.S. troops and hundreds of Seminole were killed,
and another 4,420 Seminole were removed by force to the Indian
Territory.127 When the war ended without a treaty in 1842, only 300
Seminoles were left in Florida.128 One final burst of resistance, known as
the Third Seminole War (1855-58), resulted in the deportation of another
168 Seminole from Florida to Oklahoma.129 At the end of this period, only
200 or so Seminole remained in the state.
The federally recognized Seminole and Miccosukee Tribes of Florida
121

See WEISMAN, UNCONQUERED PEOPLE, supra note 105, at 46.
Id. at 47.
123 See id. at 45-49. Weisman also discusses the influence of the Creek War of 1814 on the
emerging Seminole identity. The conflict, which started as a battle among Creek factions concerning
pressures to capitulate to American settlement, ended with Andrew Jackson leading U.S. troops against
the anti-assimilationist Creeks. See id. at 48. Many Creeks were killed, but some fled into Florida,
spurring Jackson to pursue them in what became the First Seminole War, discussed above. Jackson’s
failure to capture the fleeing Creeks, who then remained in Florida and became Seminole, contributed to
the emerging Seminole identity as people who would not be subdued. As Weisman notes, among the
Indians that evaded capture was a “boy in his early teen years . . . who was to be known in manhood as
Osceola . . . .” Id. at 48.
124 See ANDERSON, supra note 118, at 52-53.
125 See WEISMAN, UNCONQUERED PEOPLE, supra note 105, at 49.
126 See id. at 50-51.
127 See id. at 57-58. But see James W. Covington, Trail Indians of Florida, in 58:1 FLA. HIST.
Q. 37, 38 (July 1979) (providing figure of 3,000 Seminoles who had been captured or surrendered
during Second and Third Seminole Wars).
128 WEISMAN, UNCONQUERED PEOPLE, supra note 105, at 57.
129 See id. at 59.
122
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and the non-recognized Independent Seminoles, who today have a
combined population of nearly 3,000, descend from this group of 200 who
resisted the U.S. military’s repeated efforts to remove them from Florida.
Brent Weisman has theorized that the Seminole response to Removal
during the Second Seminole War in particular solidified their identity as a
distinct people:
Like other native peoples in postcontact North America whose
political and ethnic identities reflect contact with an intrusive society,
the Seminoles had pluralistic cultural and biological origins and were
composed of groups speaking different languages with distinct
histories . . . . In the organized resistance to the removal effort [during
the period of the Second Seminole War], the Seminole identity was
given birth as a ‘creative adaptation’ to violent change.130
To summarize, by the middle of the nineteenth century, the process of
“creative adaptation” had crystallized into a clear Seminole identity. That
identity was forged during several periods of American policies toward
Native people that dislocated them from their pre-contact lands through
invasion, disease, war, and forced removal. Larger economic and social
forces, including the battle over slavery and its extension into the territories,
also contributed to the unique ethnic and cultural composition of the people
who became Seminole. The combined efforts to eliminate indigenous
peoples and secure the South for a plantation economy resulted in a
vigorously independent group, descended largely from the Lower Creeks
but also including other indigenous and African-American people, who
became the Seminole Indians of Florida.
3. From Seminole to the Federally Recognized Seminole and
Miccosukee Tribes of Florida
The roughly 200 Seminole who remained in Florida after the Third
Seminole War lived in village and clan-based communities throughout
southern Florida.131 Non-Indian settlement continued to put pressure on
these communities, however, and despite Seminole resistance to being
confined to specific reservations, the need to secure at least some lands
from drainage and incursion became increasingly necessary for survival.
The Seminole reestablished limited relations with the state and federal
governments toward the end of the nineteenth century, and secured state
and federal reservation lands during the period between 1911 and 1935.132
130

Weisman, supra note 99, at 198-99.
See Covington, supra note 127, at 38.
132 See generally 4 NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE LEGACY OF HARRY S. TRUMAN, THE TRUMAN
LEGACY SERIES (Brian Hosmer ed., 2006); see also Jessica R. Cattelino, Termination Redux? Seminole
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During these years, the next shift in Seminole political and cultural
identity occurred. The Big Cypress Reservation was established in 1937,
and the government appointed a white man who spoke Mikasuki to be the
agent there.133 The agent was able to recruit several of the families living
nearby to move to the reservation. According to historian James W.
Covington, “Those . . . who left their villages to live on the Big Cypress
Reservation represented an element of the Indian population undergoing
rapid change.”134 One aspect of this was that some Seminoles were
converting to Christianity, and in particular becoming members of the
Baptist faith. The Big Cypress Reservation was a place where “a center for
the Christians could be maintained.”135
Other Seminoles remained in villages in and near the Everglades.
They maintained a land-based economy and culture, supporting themselves
by hunting, fishing, small-scale agriculture, and gathering wild plants.136
When the Tamiami Trail (U.S. Highway 41) was constructed to cut through
the Everglades, some of these Seminole moved to scattered communities
along the Highway, and became known as the “Trail Indians.”137 The
Seminole from these communities who refused to move to the Big Cypress
or other reservations created an identity distinct from the Seminoles who
had relocated, and eventually the two groups formed the basis for what
would become two distinct federally recognized tribes. To some extent, the
divide was cultural. The Trail Indians identified as hewing more closely to
indigenous cultural and religious practices than the Seminole who had
moved onto reservations.138 In addition to refusing to relocate, they took
pride in their independence from federal assistance and their maintenance of
traditional ecological knowledge, which they passed on to the younger
generations.139 Despite these emerging differences in cultural identity, all
Seminole, whether reservation-based or not, kept their core traditions alive.
The most significant practice was (and remains) the Green Corn Dance, and
this “central religious, social, and political focus of tribal life” was
maintained by all Seminole, whether on-reservation or not.140
Given all that the Trail group and the reservation Seminoles shared, it
seems unlikely that the emerging cultural differences would have been
Citizenship and Economy from Truman to Gaming in 4 NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE LEGACY OF
HARRY S. TRUMAN, THE TRUMAN LEGACY SERIES 122-35 (Brian Hosmer, ed., 2006).
133
Covington, supra note 127, at 40.
134
Id. at 40.
135
Id. at 40-41.
136
Id. at 40.
137
See generally id.
138
See id. at 42.
139
See id. at 40, 42.
140
Id. at 42.
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enough on their own to cause the formal split into two tribes. Instead, the
catalysts were legal and political. First, the reservation-based Seminoles
filed a claim against the United States under the Indian Claims Commission
Act for taking Seminole land and other violations during the period of the
Seminole Wars.141 The Seminole who filed the case had hired a law firm to
represent them, but the bands of people living along the Tamiami Trail or
otherwise outside of the reservations had not participated in nor authorized
the representation.142 The Trail Indians, most of whom spoke Mikasuki,
sought their own legal counsel and began to differentiate themselves from
the legal and political strategies of the reservation Seminole.143 During this
process, the Miccosukee emerged as a distinct self-governing political
entity.
Second, while the claims case was being pursued, the Federal
Government embarked on its short-lived and disastrous policy of
terminating the federal relationship with American Indian tribes. The
Termination Era (1947-1961), as it is known, began after World War II
when various political sentiments converged on the conclusion that the
“Indian problem” could be solved once and for all by eliminating the
separate political status of American Indian tribes.144 Federal bureaucrats
and politicians hatched the idea, and it had a sufficient veneer of equality
and civil rights to gain momentum. Senator Arthur V. Watkins, the Chair
of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs held blatantly prejudiced views
of American Indians, including that “[t]hey want all the benefits of the
things we have . . . highways, schools, hospitals, everything that civilization
furnishes, but they don’t want to help pay their share of it.”145 Yet Watkins
was also convinced that his effort to impose termination unilaterally on
Indian people was a benevolent act of emancipation:
In view of the historic policy of Congress favoring freedom for the
Indians, we may well expect future Congresses to continue to endorse
the principle that “as rapidly as possible” we should end the status of
Indians as wards of the government and grant them all of the rights and
prerogatives pertaining to American citizenship.
With the aim of equality before the law in mind our course should
rightly be no other . . . .
Following in the footsteps of the

141

See id. at 41.
See id. at 42.
143 See id. at 42-43; see also Harry A. Kersey, Jr., “Give Us Twenty-Five Years”: Florida
Seminoles from New Termination to Self-Determination, 1953-1957, in 67:3 FLA. HIST. Q. 290, 298 (Jan.
1989).
144 See ANDERSON, supra note 118, at 142-45.
145 CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN NATIONS 68-69
(2005) (internal quotations omitted).
142
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Emancipation Proclamation of ninety-four years ago, I see the
following words emblazoned in letters of fire above the heads of
Indians—THESE PEOPLE SHALL BE FREE!146
For the overwhelming majority of American Indian people, freedom
meant keeping their lands and maintaining their separate political status, not
eliminating them. But neither Watkins nor any other of the architects of
termination had bothered to ask them. House Concurrent Resolution 108,
which outlined the Termination era’s goals, was passed without any
meaningful consultation with tribes.147 Termination policies included
subjecting some tribes to state criminal and civil laws, funding urban
relocation programs to incentivize tribal people to leave their reservations,
and eliminating the separate political status and trust relationship with
certain listed tribes.148 For reasons that remain somewhat mysterious, the
Florida Seminoles were on H.C.R. 108’s list of tribes to be considered for
termination.149 While tribes were afforded virtually no input concerning
whether they should be on the list, Congress had to pass a separate
termination bill for each tribe. Hearings were conducted on the bills, and
this was when the Seminole and other tribes had a brief and vital chance to
make their voices heard.
The Senate and the House of Representatives introduced companion
Seminole termination bills in January of 1954. Senator Watkins presided
over hearings on the bills before a joint subcommittee in March of the same
year. The Seminole bills provided that within three years, the Secretary of
the Interior would release all tribal lands from protected trust status, transfer
them to a tribal corporation or its elected trustees, and then open the lands
for sale.150 Shortly thereafter, the federal trust relationship with the tribe
would be formally severed.151 Two separate groups of Seminoles, one
representing the on-reservation and the other the off-reservation, or Trail,
group, came to Washington to speak against termination.152 A delegation of
eight people elected by the on-reservation Seminole testified at the hearings
and entered a prepared statement into the record requesting “that no action
be taken on the termination of Federal supervision over the property of the

146 ANDERSON, supra note 118, at 143-44 (quoting Arthur V. Watkins, Termination of Federal
Supervision: The Removal of Restrictions over Indian Property and Person, 311 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 50, 55 (May, 1957).
147 See 67 STAT. B132 (Aug. 1, 1953).
148 See ANDERSON, supra note 118, at 142-51 (summarizing termination era policies).
149 See Kersey, Jr., supra note 143, at 292-93 (discussing possible explanations).
150 Id. at 294-95.
151 Id. at 295.
152 See Covington, supra note 127, at 43; Kersey, Jr., supra note 143, at 295-98.
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Seminole Indians for a period of 25 years.”153 Their reasons included that
basic services and infrastructure, including, housing, education, and health
care, were not yet sufficient to meet the tribe’s needs and allow them to
manage their own affairs independently. The inadequate services also
affected the tribe’s ability to manage its land, and a premature release of
tribal land from trust status could result in the tribe’s inability to make tax
payments.154
The off-reservation Seminole, who increasingly self-identified as
Miccosukee, also opposed Congress’s actions, but they used different
rhetoric and tactics.155 George Osceola and Jimmie Billie represented the
Miccosukee, and instead of testifying before Congress, sought to meet with
President Eisenhower directly.156 While in Washington, they presented
their “Buckskin Declaration,” which expressed the Miccosukee intent to
maintain their separate cultural and political existence as well as their
land.157 According to historian Harry Kersey, Jr., it was in response to
President Eisenhower’s sympathetic reply that nonetheless urged the
Miccosukee to work through existing bureaucratic channels that “the
Mikasukis [sic] developed a position that they were an independent nation
with a political existence separate from other Seminoles.”158
The Seminole and Miccosukee opposition succeeded in staving off the
termination bills in 1954.159 There was a revival of the idea in 1955, and
the House Subcommittee on Indian Affairs held hearings in Florida during
April of that year. The Seminole and Miccosukee again spoke out against
termination, and their voices were joined by those of several local officials
who were concerned about the increased burden on state and local
services.160 Again, the diverging positions of the Seminole and Miccosukee
became apparent. The Miccosukee raised the issue of the Seminole claims
case during their testimony, with Buffalo Tiger stating “‘We don’t want a
claim for money’ . . . ‘we want a claim for land.’”161 In the end, no
Seminole termination legislation was introduced that year or ever after, and
in retrospect historians have wondered why the Seminole, few in number

153 Kersey, Jr., supra note 143, at 295 (quoting U.S. Congress, Termination of Federal
Supervision Over Certain Tribes of Indians, 83d Cong., 2nd sess., on S. 2747 and H.R. 7321, Part 8,
Seminole Indians, Florida, March 1-2, 1954 (Washington, D.C. 1954)) at 1038.
154 See Kersey, Jr., supra note 143, at 295.
155 See Covington, supra note 127, at 43.
156 Covington, supra note 127, at 43; Kersey, Jr., supra note 143, at 299.
157 Covington, supra note 127, at 43.
158 Kersey, Jr., supra note 143, at 299.
159 Id. at 297-99.
160 See id. at 300-01.
161 Kersey, Jr., supra note 143, at 301 (quoting the hearings before the subcommittee discussed
supra note 149).
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and persistently outspoken in their desire to remain independent peoples,
were on the list at all.162
The lasting impact for the Seminole and Miccosukee was the
separation into two federally recognized tribes. Shortly after the threat of
termination subsided, the on-reservation Seminoles began to consider
organizing formally, under the Indian Reorganization Act. Having barely
escaped involuntary termination of their separate status, they wanted to
ensure against any future efforts along those lines. A group of Seminole
leaders that included Sam Tommie, Billy Osceoloa, Frank Billie, and Bill
Osceola led the drive toward IRA organization, and federal officials
supported them.163 The Miccosukee group refused to join, and the onreservation Seminole decided to move forward largely without them.164 In
1957, an IRA charter was issued to the Seminole Tribe of Florida, and the
charter was ratified by a majority of voters, who included at least thirty
percent of those eligible to participate in the election.165 The Tribe then
adopted its constitution and by-laws, and the Tribal Council became its
governing body.166 The split between the Seminole Tribe of Florida and the
Miccosukee was complete.
The next chapter was for the Miccosukee to obtain separate federally
recognized status. They took steps toward formal organization under state
law during the same period that the Seminoles were working on their IRA
status. In 1957, the Everglades Miccosukee General Council adopted a
constitution that was recognized by the State of Florida.167 Eventually,
however, the Miccosukee’s efforts to obtain recognition and land from
Florida ran into opposition. They began, as the 1960s dawned, to engage in
pan-Indian organizing and to reach out to international as well as national
agencies to address their concerns.168 The Miccosukee’s outreach included
sending a “‘buckskin of recognition’ to Fidel Castro who had just come to
power in Cuba.”169 The Miccosukee succeeded on several fronts with their
efforts. Florida set aside 143,400 acres of the Everglades for their use in
1959. Then, with the support of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and no
opposition from the Seminole Tribe, the Miccosukee adopted a constitution
and bylaws, and achieved federal recognition in 1962 as the Miccosukee

162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169

See id. at 303.
Id. at 303-04.
See id.
Id. at 306-07.
Id.
See Covington, supra note 127, at 48-49.
See id. at 52.
Id. at 52.
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Tribe of Indians of Florida.170
For both of Florida’s federally recognized tribes, official status has
brought many benefits. Federal services, including schools, health care,
and housing, became available. Self-determination era policies facilitated
tribal control over these programs, and also gave the tribes room to build
their economies while safeguarding their traditions and cultures.171 Their
separate political status has also furthered the process of divergent identity
formation for the Seminole and Miccosukee. Although descending from
core groups of ancestors, and sharing a history of resisting various efforts to
eliminate them, their distinct responses to contemporary pressures have
resulted in two separate political and cultural bodies, albeit with much in
common. Within each tribe, the different paths to persisting as Seminole
are reflected in a modern and evolving polity.
III. TRIBAL MEMBERSHIP RULES ARE POLITICAL TOO
In the decades before their respective federal recognitions in 1957 and
1962, the Seminole and Miccosukee Tribes shared common ancestry,
language, and culture, which also inevitably reflected how the Seminole
people had responded to the processes of settler colonialism.172 Law and
politics then separated this fairly cohesive (though unquestionably diverse)
ethnic and cultural group into two distinct federally recognized tribes, each
of which, to obtain federally recognized status, had to adopt criteria for
membership going forward.173 Today, both tribes have membership criteria
that reflect a strong interest in maintaining their distinct identities as
Seminole and Miccosukee peoples, and in cultivating participation in and
connection to their cultural and political practices. Their identities as
Seminole and Miccosukee also necessarily include the history of
colonization, attempted elimination, and oppression that they have endured.
The Seminole Tribe initially adopted membership rules that allowed
enrollment based on the federal census lists of the Seminole Agency in
1957. The following categories of people were eligible for enrollment: (1)
any person of Seminole Indian blood, regardless of blood quantum, whose
name appeared on the Census Roll of the Seminole Agency at the time of
federal recognition; (2) any child of Seminole Indian blood, born to a parent

170

Id. at 53.
See Kersey, Jr., supra note 143, at 308-09 (describing Miccosukee programs); for a thorough
overview of tribal programs, see Government, SEMINOLE TRIBE FLA., http://www.semtribe.com (last
visited Mar. 31, 2014); Enterprises SEMINOLE TRIBE FLA., http://www.semtribe.com (last visited Mar.
31, 2014); Services, SEMINOLE TRIBE FLA., http://www.semtribe.com (last visited Mar. 31, 2014).
172 See supra Part II; see also MARK EDWIN MILLER, CLAIMING TRIBAL IDENTITY: THE FIVE
TRIBES AND THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT 163 (2013).
173 See 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(d).
171
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or parents either or both of whose names appeared on the Census Roll,
regardless of blood quantum or places of residence; (3) any descendant of
Seminole Indian blood of a person whose name appeared on the Census
Roll.174 In 1963, the Tribe revised its membership criteria to require one
quarter or more degree of Seminole Indian blood to be eligible to enroll.175
Today, to enroll in the Seminole Tribe, three criteria must be met. First, an
individual must have “a direct relationship to a Seminole who is listed on
the 1957 Tribal Roll.”176 Second, the person’s blood quantum must be no
less than one quarter, “which indicates that she is no more than a single
generation removed from the cultural heritage.”177 And third, “the applicant
must be sponsored for membership by a current Tribal member and
accepted by vote of the Tribal Council.”178
The Seminole Tribe’s Department of Anthropology & Genealogy
provides a nuanced explanation for these requirements. It begins by noting
that blood quantum itself has “only a limited value . . . .”179 Its purpose is
not to enforce biological coherence or genealogical purity, but rather to
track proximity to the tribe’s political formation in 1957 as well as current
connection to the tribal community. As the Department states, “[i]n the
final analysis, [] all of these criteria are dependent upon a single criterion:
group recognition . . . . [I]f the group recognizes you as a member, you are
a member and, if they do not, you are not.”180 In this context, as the Tribe
makes clear, the blood quantum requirement is not a proxy for race; it is a
proxy for connection and belonging.
The Tribe could adopt other criteria that would accomplish the same
goals, including residence requirements, cultural or linguistic orthodoxy
requirements, or the “public will of the group.”181 But the blood quantum
requirement, which essentially requires a familial tie to the previous
generation of tribal members, maintains the Tribe’s relationship to its
indigenous heritage, which its people fought for centuries to keep alive. To
the Seminole, diluting the one quarter blood quantum requirement would be
tantamount to conceding their assimilation into non-Indian society just at
the point when their self-governing powers and separate status are safe from
attack: “[w]hat all of the wars and treaties and diseases could not
174 CONST. & BYLAWS SEMINOLE TRIBE FLA. of Aug. 21, 1957, available at
http://Thorpe.ou.edu/IRA/flsemcons.html.
175 See Kersey, Jr., supra note 143, at 307, citing CONST. AND BYLAWS OF THE SEMINOLE TRIBE
OF FLA. (as amended), U.S. Dept. of Int., Bureau of Indian Affairs, (D.C., 1967).
176 See generally SEMINOLE TRIBE FLA., supra note 171.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 See id.
180 Id.
181 See id.
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accomplish—the destruction of the Seminoles—would be accomplished
now, for the sole sake of a misperceived political expediency.”182
The Seminole Tribe’s explanation also acknowledges the troubled
history of the Federal Government’s use of blood quantum requirements.
Tribes themselves had no need for such criteria prior to European contact.
In pre-contact times, membership was not fixed by colonial processes
aimed at accounting for and eventually shrinking their populations.183
Rather, “Indian groups were distinct, and controlled their own memberships
absolutely, and admitted or rejected whomsoever they pleased.”184 It was
the United States that first imposed blood quantum requirements on tribes,
focusing on “this single criterion, and [taking] it out of the context of the
numerous criteria that the Indians themselves used, and assigned to it an
unrealistic degree of importance . . . .”185 The Seminole Tribe does not use
blood quantum in this reductive way, to sort Indians from non-Indians for
the purpose of federal control. Rather, the Tribe is clear that it is a tie to the
Seminole Tribe, its place, and its culture that matters. A close familial tie is
one part of that assessment, but not an on/off switch for being considered
Indian.
The strong sense that emerges from the Seminole Tribe’s explanation
of its membership rules is that they aim to ask one core question: are you
truly a part of our unique Seminole community that has survived despite the
odds, or would allowing you to join be a small step backward toward the
abandoned goal of eliminating us? While the criterion of “blood quantum”
is part of the equation, it is used to ensure a connection to a political
community (defined at the moment of legal recognition of the Seminole
Tribe in 1957) and to perpetuate the cultural norm of group determination
of membership.
The Miccosukee Tribe has published less about its membership
criteria, but the aims appear similar from the face of the Tribe’s rules.
When the Miccosukee Tribe achieved recognition in 1962, the Constitution
established membership criteria for the six-month period after ratification
and approval. These were: (1) that all adults and children of one-half
degree or more Miccosukee Indian blood would be eligible for
membership; (2) that all children of one-half or more Miccosukee Indian
blood born to members of the Tribe were eligible; and (3) that all adults or
children of less than one-half degree Miccosukee blood who apply for
membership and have their applications approved may join the Tribe.186
182

Id.
For more on this process generally, see Inextricably Political, supra note 2.
184 See SEMINOLE TRIBE FLA., supra note 171.
185 See id.
186 CONST. MICCOSUKEE TRIBE OF INDIANS FLA., Art. 2, § 1,
183

available

at
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Today, Miccosukee membership “is open to individuals who have
Miccosukee mothers and are not enrolled in any other Tribe.”187 The Tribe
follows its traditional matrilineal system of inheritance and kinship, and
therefore children are born into their mother’s clan, from which they gain
status in the Tribe. The Tribe’s web site also mentions that the
“Miccosukee Service Area is composed of Tribal members and their
families, independent Miccosukees, Seminoles and other Indian families
residing along the Tamiami Trail from Miami to Naples. The total
population of the Miccosukee Service [A]rea is about 640.”188 In other
words, the Miccosukee Tribe serves an indigenous population broader than
the Tribe’s membership.
The Seminole and Miccosukee Tribe’s membership criteria reflect the
road they have traveled to become federally recognized tribes. The use of
close ancestry (or “blood quantum”) requirements is an effort to maintain
their indigenous identities despite the many attempts that have been made to
eliminate them as separate peoples, which included lumping them with the
Creeks for the expedience of invading Florida, removing them to the Indian
territory, and attempting to terminate their political relationship with the
Federal Government.189 As expressed by the Seminole Tribe, the
requirement of one degree of removal from a relative who is a tribal
member reflects a desire to keep an intact community that knows its culture
and history, and can perpetuate both.190
The Miccosukee Tribe’s
matrilineal descent requirement reflects the same goals.191
They may seem anathema to liberal consent-based theories of
democratic communities, but American Indian tribes’ ancestry requirements
reflect efforts to reclaim group identities that were assailed until the
contemporary era. Until very recently, the overarching logic of U.S.
policies toward indigenous peoples was to eliminate them.192 Tribes were
inconvenient barriers to non-Indian settlement and access to natural
resources.193 Now, federally recognized tribes have some assurance that
they can continue as separate sovereigns to chart their own economic and

http://www.indigenouspeople.net/micconst.htm (the site labels the Miccosukee Constitution as the
“Constitution of the Miccosukee Nation,” but the Tribe’s legal name is Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of
Florida, as evident in the Constitution itself).
187 Tribal Programs and Business, MICCOSUKEE TRIBE FLA., http://www.miccosukee.com/tribe
(last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
188 Id.
189 See supra Part II.
190 See SEMINOLE TRIBE FLA., supra note 171.
191 See MICCOSUKEE TRIBE FLA., Tribal Programs & Business, supra note 187.
192 See Inextricably Political, supra note 2; Wolfe, supra note 1.
193 See Inextricably Political, supra note 2; see also Krakoff, Settler Colonialism and
Reclamation, supra note 2.
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cultural futures. For those futures to be tribal, however, some tie to a
tribe’s pre-contact roots is necessary as are contemporary membership
criteria that reflect the tribe’s own norms for inclusion. Those can and do
vary, with some tribes relying only on lineal descent from an historic group
and others, like the Seminole and Miccosukee, requiring closer ties.194
Tribal histories regarding their paths to federal recognition also make clear,
however, that by the time a tribe achieves that status, its members already
reflect a mix of identities—linguistic, ethnic, and otherwise.195 Tribes’
membership rules are therefore not “racial” in either a biological or a
socially constructed sense, except insofar as they inevitably reflect the ways
that tribes and Indians themselves were racialized by U.S. laws and
policies. The best, and perhaps only, way to reverse that process of
subordination is to allow tribes today to define their members free from
non-Indian constraint. Leading Lakota intellectual and scholar Vine
Deloria, Jr. advocated a similar position when he remarked, “‘[b]efore the
white man can relate to others he must forego the pleasure of defining
them.’”196
IV. EQUAL PROTECTION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW: DOING THE LEAST HARM
As discussed in Part II, in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, the Supreme
Court expressed “equal protection concerns” about the prospect of a child
who was eligible for enrollment in an Indian tribe being unavailable for
adoption to non-Indians.197 The Court’s several references to Baby
Veronica’s “1.2%” Cherokee lineage give the impression that the Court’s
concerns arose due to a perception that the child was not really Indian.198
As the foregoing histories reveal, the recurring enemy to American Indian
tribal existence has been non-Indian power to set the terms of their identity.
If tribes could not be eliminated through disease and violence, then removal
and containment might do the job. When these policies failed to eradicate
all tribes, efforts to assimilate them out of existence, including unilaterally
imposing membership requirements, became a dominant strategy.199 More
recently, during the era of termination, the Federal Government opted for
ending the separate political status of tribes through a variety of legal
194 While it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss in detail, tribes in the Southeast might
have gravitated toward tighter membership requirements in response to a wave of non-Indians who
claimed Indian identity for a variety of fraudulent or spurious purposes. See MILLER, supra note 172, at
8.
195 See supra Part II; see also Inextricably Political, supra note 2.
196 DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS 93 (1991) (quoting Deloria, Jr.).
197 See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2565 (2013).
198 See id. at 2556.
199 For more on allotment and assimilation policies and their relationship to racial formation in
the Indian context, see Inextricably Political, supra note 2, at 1065-75.
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mechanisms, a sublimely bureaucratic approach to eliminating tribes. The
Court, by questioning Baby Veronica’s Cherokee identity and intimating
that it might be tantamount to an invidious racial classification, unwittingly
echoes the logic and policies of American Indian elimination.
Unguided judicial scrutiny of classifications that further the unique
government-to-government relationship with American Indian tribes is
more likely to perpetuate the subordination of Indian people than to reverse
it.200 Instead of regressing in this way, the Court should adhere to Mancari.
As the histories of the Seminole and Miccosukee Tribes indicate, federally
recognized tribes are indeed political bodies, and their members are
ethnically, linguistically, and even racially diverse, reflecting their varied
histories of evolving from pre-contact peoples to present-day tribes.
Further, the Seminole and Miccosukee Tribes’ federally recognized status
depends not only on their ties to an aboriginal people, but equally on their
political and strategic responses to policies of elimination. Proving the
point, the Independent Seminoles of Florida are just as indigenous as the
Miccosukee and Seminole Tribes, but the Independent Seminoles have
chosen not to seek federal recognition on cultural and political grounds.
The distinction between the Independent Seminoles, and even among the
Miccosukee and Seminole Tribes, is therefore political, not racial or ethnic,
even while the composition of all of these groups also reflects both how
U.S. policies deployed race in the American Indian context, as well as the
tribes’ continuing connection to their aboriginal roots.
The Supreme Court’s constitutional concern in Adoptive Couple v.
Baby Girl, to put it bluntly, is that questionable Indian ties will be used to
gain strategic advantage in custody and adoption cases.201 In lower court
cases, there is an analogous narrative emerging in the context of economic
regulation. In KG Urban Enterprises, LLC v. Patrick, a case percolating
through the federal courts, a non-Indian gaming company challenged a
Massachusetts law on equal protection grounds.202 The case is procedurally
200 Under the Mancari framework, courts already have the tools to scrutinize legislation that
discriminates against Indian people on the basis of their race, as well as to question federal legislation
that does not further the government’s unique obligations to tribes. The Court can also, under existing
law, exercise its power of judicial review to nudge Congress to live up to its trust obligations. See
Inextricably Political, supra note 2, at 1122 n.490 (and sources cited therein). That the Court does not
do so, and in fact has regressed on this front in recent years, provides yet another reason to adhere to
formulations that restrain the Court from unguided intermeddling.
201 The Court says as much. See 133 S. Ct. at 2565:

[U]nder the State Supreme Court’s reading, the [ICWA] would put certain vulnerable children at a
great disadvantage solely because an ancestor—even a remote one—was an Indian . . . . [A]
biological Indian father could abandon his child in utero and refuse any support for the birth
mother . . . and then could play his ICWA trump card at the eleventh hour to override the mother’s
decision and the child’s best interests.
202 See KG Urban Enters. LLC v. Patrick, No. 11–12070–NMG, 2014 WL 108307 (Jan. 9, 2014),
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complex, but the gist of KG Urban’s claim is that the law discriminates on
the basis of race because it affords priorities to federally recognized tribes
that, pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, might enter into a
gaming compact with the State.203 So far, KG Urban has been losing on the
merits, but its narrative of tribes as racial, as opposed to political groups,
has crept into the courts’ discussions. First, the district court rejected KG
Urban’s equal protection claim on the grounds that Mancari controlled, but
only after questioning Mancari’s reasoning and continuing relevance. The
district court described tribes as being composed of members who share
“racial heritage,” and then mused that if it could do so, “it would treat
Indian tribal status as a quasi-political, quasi-racial classification subject to
varying levels of scrutiny depending on the authority making it and the
interests at stake.”204 As I have discussed elsewhere, this multi-tiered
approach would be a mistake. It would license federal courts to impose
stereotypical views on tribes, in particular the dated notion that tribes’ only
legitimate projects pertain to land or culture.205 Fortunately, the district
court could only engage in wishful thinking along these lines. Constrained
by Mancari, it ruled against KG Urban on its equal protection claim.
The First Circuit largely affirmed the lower court’s decision to reject
KG Urban’s claims, but revived a narrow version of KG Urban’s equal
protection challenge, directing the district court to consider whether the
Massachusetts law would violate KG Urban’s constitutional rights if the
State’s waiting period for determining whether the Mashpee Tribe could
meet the IGRA requirements was unduly long.206 On remand, the district
court again rejected KG Urban’s equal protection claim, but accepted its
framing of the question to be addressed: does the Massachusetts law, either
expressly or as applied, discriminate on the basis of race by anticipating the
possibility of a gaming compact with a federally recognized tribe? The
district court, throughout the opinion, equates mention of the Mashpee
Tribe with possible evidence of “discriminatory intent.”207 In the end the
district court found no evidence of such intent, but it skipped entirely over
an important threshold question: why should a state law that treats federally
recognized tribes in distinct ways in the economic context be analyzed
through the lens of racial discrimination? Such state laws may or may not
be good policy; they may or may not be rational. But states are generally

on remand from 693 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012).
203 See KG Urban Enters., LLC, v. Patrick, 693 F.3d 1, 12 (2012).
204 KG Urban Enters., LLC v. Patrick, 839 F. Supp. 2d 388, 404 (D. Mass. 2012) aff’d in part,
vacated and remanded in part, 693 F.3d 1.
205 See Inextricably Political, supra note 2, at 1127-28.
206 See 693 F.3d at 24-28.
207 See KG Urban Enters., LLC, 2014 WL 108307 at *9-10.
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given wide leeway to make distinctions between economic actors without
being subject to heightened judicial scrutiny. One problem for the district
court was some confusion in the First Circuit opinion concerning when
states, as opposed to the Federal Government, can enact legislation that
affects tribes.208 That line of cases has generally addressed state legislation
that has intruded into tribal sovereign powers.209 States lack the authority to
pass laws that impinge on tribal inherent powers, and this has been true
since Chief Justice John Marshall penned Worcester v. Georgia.210 If states
pass laws that accommodate tribes as governments, including as
governments with inherent power to engage in economic activity, it may
well be the case that other economic actors are disadvantaged, but that
disadvantage is not a result of racial discrimination by the State. Yet if KG
Urban and its lawyer, Paul Clement, have their way, that is the approach
that the Supreme Court may someday consider.
In Adoptive Couple, the Court implicitly disparaged Cherokee
membership rules because they define too many people as “Indian” in a
way that deprives them of the opportunity to be adopted out to white
families. In KG Urban, the district court assumed that treating a tribe
differently from other economic groups was the same as “discriminating on
the basis of race.” These cases indicate that the effort to equate, in the
public mind, classifications that further the political independence of tribes
with invidious racial classifications has been succeeding. This effort
resonates disturbingly with the ways that Indian tribes and people have been
racialized throughout our history. The stereotypical Indian is dressed in
traditional garb, lives in harmony with nature (or, in the negative version, is
a savage of the wilderness), and has an ethereal (or wicked) and, in either
case, largely silent demeanor. Anything other than this “full blood” vision
is not truly Indian. The narrative of the disappearing full-blooded Indian
justified severing Indians from their land and resources, and facilitated nonIndian settlement.211 The flip side of this is that today’s tribes, especially if
they engage in mainstream economic activity, are not really “tribes,” but
amalgams of racially-related opportunists getting a leg up on non-Indian
competition. Both stereotypes should be rejected, and at a minimum,
should not undergird doctrinal shifts that would allow for subjective judicial
review of classifications that, finally in recent times, have aimed to reverse
our sorry history of attempts to eliminate Indian tribes and people.

208

See 693 F.3d at 19-23.
See Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979).
210 See 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
211 For more on the broad deployment of Native stereotypes throughout American legal thought,
see ROBERT WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT (1992).
209
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CONCLUSION
Florida’s American Indian tribes, like all American Indian tribes, are
political entities that evolved from pre-contact peoples to governments
recognized under United States law.
The classification “federally
recognized tribe” is political, at a minimum, because it reflects that process.
For the Seminole and Miccosukee Tribes, the long road to federal
recognition included evolving from pre-contact and Creek peoples to a
people distinctly known as Seminole, and then resisting repeated (and often
violent) efforts to eliminate them from the State. That today there are three
federally recognized tribes composed of Seminole people (two in Florida
and one in Oklahoma) and one unrecognized tribe is further evidence that
the distinctions among, and between tribes, are political. The Seminole
people in all four tribes have much in common linguistically and culturally,
but political and strategic responses to efforts to eliminate them resulted in
the tribes’ different statuses and geographies. Finally, the Seminole Tribes,
like all tribes, have members who derive from a variety of ethnic and
cultural backgrounds. Tribes, and especially federally recognized tribes, are
political in all of these senses.
Federally recognized tribes, including the Seminole and Miccosukee
Tribes of Florida, are required by federal law to have membership rules.
Those rules reflect the tribes priorities with respect to maintaining their
cohesiveness as a group, perpetuating their norms and customs, and
encouraging participation in governance, among other factors. The
Seminole and Miccosukee Tribes meet these goals through membership
criteria that require relatively close familial ties to tribal members (at least
one grandparent, in the case of Seminole, and a mother, in the case of
Miccosukee), as well as acceptance by the Tribe. Other tribes, like the
Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, have opted for more expansive membership
rules, requiring only lineal descent from certain census rolls. Regardless of
the form, membership criteria are political expressions of the tribe’s
priorities for perpetuating itself as a distinct people. Further, because ties to
an aboriginal people are required for federal recognition, tribes may have to
include at least lineal descent from an historic group to maintain their
separate status.
To summarize, the classification “federally recognized tribe” is
political, and tribes’ membership rules are political. Today, our laws and
policies reflect the overdue priority of supporting tribes as independent,
self-governing sovereigns. But those policies risk being undermined by the
judicial branch if its bout of “constitutional concern” gets any worse, and it
licenses judicial review of laws that further the government’s unique
obligations to tribes. Perhaps telling the Seminole story will make some bit
of difference. For those who are not optimists about influencing the Court,
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a larger solace is that the Seminole—the Unconquered People—will surely
find a way to survive nonetheless.

